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Faxing It In
HOW CONGRESS FAILED CONSUMERS WITH THE
JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the past few years, the federal government’s
regulation of telemarketing practices has enjoyed a front-andcenter position in the political spotlight. 1 In 2003, consumers
eagerly embraced the establishment of a national do-not-call
registry, 2 and in the same year, Congress enacted legislation to
Both events
curb abusive email marketing practices. 3
exemplified an admirable 4 commitment to furthering consumer
1

See, e.g., Consumers Served by Blocking Ads, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 25,
2003, at 19 (“Responding to overwhelming public demand, our federal and state
governments have recently enacted laudable new consumer protections against the
frequent onslaught of unwanted direct marketing solicitations.”). Such an increase in
federal telemarketing regulation has even inspired new compliance technology.
William C. Smith, Ensuring a Peaceful Dinner, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 8
(discussing one company’s product that automatically blocks telemarketers from
connecting to numbers currently listed on federal and state do-not-call registries).
2
Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (2003)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. III 2003)). See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, (“FCC”),
FCC-03-153, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 14-51 (2003), reprinted in 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,145 (July
3, 2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/donotcall [hereinafter 2003 FCC Memo]
(announcing implementation rules for a nationwide do-not-call list in conjunction with
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)). Just three days into the national registry’s
operation, more than ten million telephone numbers had been added to the do-not-call
list. FCC, DA 05-2056, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NAT’L DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY 2
(2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/cbg/donotcall [hereinafter FCC Do-Not-Call
Report]. By the release of the FCC’s first annual report, the number grew to 88
million. Id.
3
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. III 2003))
[hereinafter Can-Spam Act].
4
Although the email spam legislation may have been an admirable first
step, it has continued to receive much criticism. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Spam
Mushrooms, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2004, at C1 (noting new research showed spam on
the rise eight months after Can-Spam Act’s enactment); David McGuire, New Law
Won’t Can Spam, Critics Say, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5943-2003Dec16.html (“Detractors say the Can-Spam Act
will create a safe haven for e-mail marketers willing to follow certain rules for
spamming.”). The point here, however, is that Congress was at least making a good
faith first step to appease consumers by creating an initial national regulation of email
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protection against unsavory, invasive marketing tactics that
flourished thanks to cheap, easy-to-use technology. In 2005,
however, Congress strayed considerably from this apparent
trend of pro-consumer commitment when it enacted the Junk
Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (“Junk Fax Prevention Act”). 5 The
Junk Fax Prevention Act, an amendment to a previous federal
law prohibiting unsolicited marketing via facsimile machines,
exposes
fax
machine
owners
to
more
unsolicited
advertisements than allowed under the previous federal law. 6
Congress
first
addressed
unsolicited
faxed
advertisements fifteen years ago as part of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”). 7 Among other
provisions, the TCPA instituted a complete ban on unsolicited
faxed advertisements sent without the “prior express invitation
or permission” of the recipient. 8 Such a strict prohibition
against fax marketing differed from the TCPA’s more flexible
regulation of telephone marketing. 9 The justification behind
the differential treatment between the telephone and the
facsimile machine lay in the latter’s technological architecture.
It simply was not fair to require consumers to swallow the
costs—paper, ink, wear-and-tear on the machine—of
automatically-received, unwanted faxes promising great hotel
deals or special car wash discounts. 10 Congress reasoned that
the consumer protection rights of the fax recipient—who must
unfairly waste time waiting while a machine receives and
marketing. As this Note discusses, Congress’s revision of its junk fax marketing
regulations eroded strong federal statutory protection already in place.
5
The Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A § 227 (Supp. 2005)) [hereinafter Junk Fax Prevention Act].
6
See infra discussion in Part V.
7
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)) [hereinafter TCPA].
8
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (2000). The statute defines unsolicited advertisement
as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property,
goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior
express invitation or permission.” Id. The TCPA fax provision states that “[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to use any telephone facsimile
machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone
facsimile machine[.]” Id. § 227(b)(1)(C). Thus, the prohibition does not apply to (1)
faxed advertisements sent to recipients who have invited or permitted the sender to fax
an ad or (2) faxes that do not include an ad.
9
See id. § 227(a)(3)(A)-(C). The definition of telephone solicitation expressly
offers three major classes of exemptions for calls and messages. Id. In contrast, the
TCPA, as originally enacted, banned the faxing of all unsolicited advertisements. Id.
§ 227(b)(1)(C).
10
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10 (1991) (noting that fax machines “are
designed to accept, process, and print all messages which arrive over their dedicated
lines” (emphasis added)). See also infra discussion in Part V.B.
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prints out an unwanted transmission, all at the recipient’s
cost—trumped any commercial speech rights of the
marketers. 11
Almost fifteen years after the TCPA’s enactment,
Congress decided to revisit the TCPA fax provisions. By then,
fax machines had survived and surpassed their ‘80s business
stereotype and found a place in the home, in addition to the
office. 12 Soon, faxing technology became a standard feature of
personal computers and printers. 13 Congress’s reexamination
of fax marketing regulations resulted in the TCPA amendment,
The Junk Fax Prevention Act. 14 The amendment passed
quickly and quietly compared with previous telemarketing
laws, 15 and unlike other consumer protection laws, the Junk
Fax Prevention Act blossomed from the worries and needs of
the business community instead of consumers. 16
The Junk Fax Prevention Act essentially codifies an
“established business relationship” (“EBR”) exception to the
11
See TCPA, supra note 7, § 2(8) (“The Constitution does not prohibit
restrictions on commercial telemarketing solicitations.”); S. REP. NO. 102-178, at *1971
(1991) (“The [Senate] Committee [on Commerce, Science and Transportation] believes
that [the reported bill] is an example of a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction on speech, which is constitutional. . . . The Supreme Court has recognized
the legitimacy of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech when the
restrictions are not based on the content of the message being conveyed.”). For the
view that government regulation of advertising inhibits freedom of speech, see
RICHARD T. KAPLAR, ADVERTISING RIGHTS: THE NEGLECTED FREEDOM (The Media
Institute 1991) and MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
57-60 (Twentieth Century Fund 1989).
12
See, e.g., Judy Stark, The New Condo Amenities Are Towering Ideas, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 2, 2005, at 6F (noting that condo business centers are no
longer considered amenities to buyers because “[n]ow almost everyone owns a
computer and a printer/scanner/fax”); Leslie Berkman & Paul Herrera, Energy: Bigger
Homes, Lifestyles Overshadow Conservation, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Oct. 23, 2005, at
A1 (noting energy consumption in homes is increasing due in part to “home offices
equipped with computers, printers and fax machines” (emphasis added)).
13
See infra discussion in Part V.B. See also Sharon Crawford, Faxing in
Windows XP, Oct. 21, 2002, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/using/setup/learn
more/crawford_02october21.mspx (explaining how to fax using Windows XP
technology).
14
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 2 (2005) (discussing the background for enacting the
Junk Fax Prevention Act).
15
See infra discussion in Part IV.A on how quickly the bill passed. Nearly
nine months passed between the House’s introduction of its version of the TCPA and
the signing of the TCPA into law. The Can-Spam Act took eight months to pass after
its introduction. The Junk Fax Prevention Act took three months.
16
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 6 (explaining that legislation is needed to prevent
“businesses [from being] subject to unforeseen and costly litigation unrelated to
legitimate consumer protection aims” and citing “costs of training, making multiple
contracts to obtain signatures providing consent, and obtaining permission for each fax
machine when the recipients change location” as examples of business harms).
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TCPA’s blanket ban on faxed advertisements sent without
permission. 17 A recipient has an EBR with a sender if the
recipient currently interacts with or had previously interacted
with the sender. 18 Based on this past or present interaction, it
is inferred that the recipient has given the sender, as well as
the
sender’s
affiliates,
permission
to
send
faxed
advertisements. 19 Congress, as part of the TCPA, originally
created the exception to apply only to telephone solicitations.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) later imputed
the exception onto fax solicitations as part of its
implementation of TCPA rules. 20
The EBR exception thrived for more than a decade
despite the fact that the exception as applied to faxes
contravened Congress’s intent for, and the express language of,
the TCPA’s fax provision. 21 In 2003, the FCC, recognizing this,
planned to eliminate the exception it had erroneously created
and announced new written consent requirements for
unsolicited faxed advertisements. 22 Businesses balked at the
elimination of the exception and heavily lobbied Congress, 23
which reversed the FCC’s decision to eliminate the EBR by

17

Id. at 10.
See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2002) for definition of “established business
relationship.” It should be noted that the definition’s use of “inquiry” and “application”
are broad enough to include almost any interaction between a business and a
consumer, regardless of whether money ever exchanges hands. For example, a
consumer who calls to ask a question, and who does not ever purchase or transact
business with the company, now has an established business relationship with the
company, and the company may begin sending unsolicited faxed advertisements.
19
See infra discussion in Part III.A.
20
FCC, FCC-92-443, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE
TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 (1992), reprinted in 7 F.C.C.R. 8752,
available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/donotcall [hereinafter 1992 FCC Memo].
21
See infra discussion in Part III.B.
22
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 4.
23
See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Assoc. of Prof’l Ins. Agents, Junk Fax
Prevention Act Stalls in Congress (Dec. 14, 2004) (noting the association “will continue
to lobby for the passage of a measure that achieves” the goal of restoring the
established business relationship), available at http://www.pianet.com/IssuesOfFocus/
OngoingIssues/privacy/12-14-04-2.htm; Public Policy News: Update—“Do-Not-Fax”
Rule, NEWSPAPER ASS’N OF AM., May 2005 (stating that a coalition of trade
associations, including the Newspaper Association of America, petitioned the FCC to
delay the elimination of the Fax EBR in order to allow Congress to pass legislation),
available at http://www.naa.org/Government-and-Legal/Government-Affairs/PublicPolicy-News/NAA-Public-Policy-News-May-2005.aspx. See also Bart T. Murphy, Death
of the EBR Exemption May be “Greatly Exaggerated,” MODERN PRACTICE, November
2004 (noting that “several associations began lobbying efforts to restore the EBR
exemption”
in
anticipation
of
the
FCC’s
elimination),
available
at
http://practice.findlaw.com/tooltalk-1104.html.
18
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changing the EBR exception for faxed advertisements from an
administrative ruling to statutory law. 24
This Note argues that the Junk Fax Prevention Act fails
in exactly what its title promises—namely, the prevention of
junk faxes—by gravely undermining the strict prohibition
against unsolicited fax marketing set out in its parent
legislation, the TCPA. 25 Part II of this Note discusses the
legislative background and purpose of the TCPA fax
regulations. Part III details the creation of the TCPA’s various
EBR exemptions and explains why the EBR exception for faxed
advertisements (“Fax EBR”) should never have existed. Part
IV examines the FCC’s decision to eliminate the Fax EBR and
Congress’s response to this elimination by way of the Junk Fax
Prevention Act. Part V argues that the Junk Fax Prevention
Act fails to preserve the strong consumer protection set out in
the TCPA, that modern faxing technology requires stricter
telemarketing prohibitions, and that Congress should have
given greater deference to the FCC’s decision to eliminate the
Fax EBR. Part V further posits that an inadequate federal law
will effectively weaken current state laws that implement a
strict prohibition against sending unsolicited advertisements
via fax, similar to the TCPA as originally implemented. 26
Finally, Part VI explains that Congress should reinstate the
strict ban on junk faxes because other avenues of law,
including future Congressional review, a national do-not-fax
24
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 6 (2005) (“[T]he ‘Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005’
specifically creates a statutory exception from the general prohibition on sending
unsolicited advertisements if the fax is sent based on an EBR[.]”). One concern about
this EBR codification is the weakening effect it will have on states with stricter fax
marketing laws. See infra discussion in Part VI for California’s response to the Junk
Fax Prevention Act.
25
The “parent” aspect of the legislation takes on a double meaning when one
considers that the Junk Fax Prevention Act, signed into law by President George W.
Bush on July 9, 2005, has severely weakened the TCPA, signed into law by his father,
President George H.W. Bush, on December 20, 1991. See Law to Stop Junk Calls,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 21, 1991, at 9 (noting President George W. Bush signed new
telemarketing law).
26
The TCPA, and by extension, the Junk Fax Prevention Act, has no
preemptive effect on state junk fax laws already in place that offer more protection
than the TCPA, except the TCPA preempts certain technological requirements on
telemarketing equipment. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (“State law not preempted. . . .
[N]othing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shall
preempt any State law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or
regulations.”). By contrast, the Can-Spam Act explicitly preempted all state email
spam laws. Can-Spam Act, supra note 3, § 8 (“This Act supersedes any statute,
regulation or rule of a State . . . that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to
send commercial messages . . . .”). See infra discussion in Part V.C on how a weaker
interstate fax rule effectively weakens stronger intrastate fax laws.
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would

provide

II.

THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991

A.

Brief History of the TCPA

The TCPA was an extensive, ambitious amendment to
the Communications Act of 1934 27 that regulated the rapidly
expanding and increasingly automated telemarketing
industry. 28 The Senate and House Reports addressing the
TCPA 29 emphasized the need to “protect the privacy interest of
residential telephone subscribers,” as well as to facilitate
interstate commerce. 30 Congress also acknowledged its duty to
consider the telemarketers’ interest in freedom of commercial
speech. 31
What troubled Congress was not limited to the
nuisances of a solicitor phoning too late in the evening or
interrupting dinner with tempting offers of magazine
discounts. In fact, Congress reserved the strictest provisions
for those types of human-less telemarketing practices that
made it difficult for consumers to protest, such as automated
dialing systems, pre-recorded messages and facsimile
transmissions. 32 The TCPA’s legislative history makes a clear
27
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1934 Communications Act].
28
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1969 (1991) (noting an increasing number of
consumer telemarketing complaints due to “the increasing number of telemarketing
firms in the business of placing telephone calls, and the advance of technology which
makes automated phone calls more cost-effective”).
29
The finished TCPA was a combination of several bills introduced into
Congress, including S. 1462 (Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act), S. 1410
(Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act) and H.R. 1304 (Telephone Advertising
Consumer Rights Act).
30
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1968. Specifically, residential and business
subscribers were concerned about automatic dialers tying up lines and preventing any
outgoing calls, as well as automated calls that did not disconnect from the line even
after the called party hung up the phone. Id.
31
See id. at 1973 (“These regulations are consistent with the constitutional
guarantee of free speech.”). See also “Findings” in H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *2 (1991)
(“Individuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial freedoms of
speech and trade must be balanced in a way that protects the privacy of individuals
and permits legitimate telemarketing practices.”).
32
See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1972 (“In addition, it is clear that automated
telephone calls that deliver an artificial or prerecorded voice message are more of a
nuisance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by ‘live’ persons.”). In fact,
an earlier version of the TCPA was titled “Automated Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.” Id. at 1970. This distinction between these two types of telemarketing can be
further inferred from that fact that the Direct Marketing Association and other groups

2006]

FAXING IT IN

351

distinction between live in-person calls and new technologies
that rendered human solicitors unnecessary. 33
At the time of the TCPA’s enactment, more than forty
states had implemented or were in the process of implementing
legislation restricting or flat-out prohibiting telemarketing
activity within the state, but these laws could not reach
interstate telephone calls or faxes. 34 The TCPA was created in
part to address this gap in jurisdiction. 35 In the case of a TCPA
provision conflicting with a state telemarketing law, the
stricter law would prevail. 36
The FCC opposed the TCPA, seeing no need for
sweeping federal legislation regulating telemarketing
activity. 37 The agency argued that it preferred handling
unsolicited marketing calls with “continued regulatory scrutiny
Congress, possibly
and monitoring” without legislation. 38
skeptical of this contention because the FCC had previously
declined to regulate unsolicited calls in 1980 and 1986, 39
ultimately passed the TCPA. In the final bill, Congress
included a provision that designated the FCC as a major
interpreter of the TCPA. 40 In this role, the FCC would later

representing telemarketing companies that did not use automatic dialers or other
equipment to make automated phone calls did not object to legislation targeting only
the automated telemarketing industry. Id. at 1971.
33
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10. There was a special concern that
certain automated systems endangered public safety by tying up phone lines of
hospitals, emergency responders, and law enforcement agencies. Id. See also S. REP.
NO. 102-178, at 1972 (“[I]t is legitimate and consistent with the constitution to impose
greater restrictions on automated calls than on calls placed by ‘live’ persons.”).
34
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1970.
35
Id. at 1970 (“These [state] measures have had limited effect, however,
because States do not have jurisdiction over interstate calls. Many States have
expressed a desire for Federal legislation to regulate interstate telemarketing calls to
supplement their restrictions on intrastate calls.”).
36
47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2000). Although the language of the preemption
provision addresses only preemption of state laws affecting intrastate faxes that are
less restrictive than the TCPA, the question has recently been raised whether states
would have the ability to create a state law affecting both intrastate faxes and
interstate faxes that cross their state lines. See infra Part VI for discussion of
California’s attempt to create a more restrictive junk fax law than the Junk Fax
Prevention Act that would affect faxes entering or leaving California.
37
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1970 (quoting then-FCC Chairman Alfred C.
Sikes).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (ordering the FCC “to prescribe regulations to
implement the requirements of” TCPA provisions).
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cause great controversy over its interpretation of the TCPA fax
provision. 41
B.

The TCPA Fax Provision

While the majority of the TCPA addressed the
restriction of certain telephone marketing activities, the TCPA
also prohibited the faxing of any unsolicited advertisements
without “prior express invitation or permission.” 42 The statute
provided no definition of prior express invitation or permission,
but the Congressional reports put the responsibility of
determining the definition of the phrase “invited or given
permission” on the telemarketers. 43 No exceptions were carved
out for unsolicited faxed advertisements in the statutory
language—prior invitation or permission was a must. 44
The law allowed 45 consumers to bring a private action in
state court against violators of the TCPA fax provision,
provided state laws or rules did not contradict such a right of
action. 46 State officials had the option to bring civil actions in
federal court in the name of their citizens. 47 If the recipient of
41

See infra discussion in Part III-IV.
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4).
43
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1975-76 (“While telemarketers will be responsible
for determining whether a potential recipient of an advertisement, in fact, has invited
or given permission to receive such fax messages, such a responsibility, is the
minimum necessary to protect unwilling recipients from receiving fax messages that
are detrimental to the owner’s uses of his or her fax machine.”). Additionally, 47
U.S.C. § 227(d) creates minimum technical identification standards for fax machines,
including fax number identification and date/time stamps, but these standards are not
relevant to this Note because they affect manufacturers of the machines, not
advertisers who use the machines.
44
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227.
45
Although this section incorporates past tense language because it is
describing the TCPA at the time of enactment, the Junk Fax Prevention Act had no
effect on the penalty and cause of action provisions, which remain effective today. See
generally Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5.
46
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (allowing for an action “if otherwise permitted by the
laws or rules of court of a State”). There have been many battles over the permission
provision as to whether it meant states had to officially opt-in legislation recognizing
the TCPA’s authority through an affirmative action, whether states had to officially
opt-out to reject the TCPA, or whether the language was merely an acknowledgement
of the states’ ability to decide how their courts would handle TCPA claims. Courts in
early cases chose to adopt an “opt-out” approach, interpreting a state legislature’s
silence on the TCPA as acceptance, while courts in more recent cases have embraced
the “acknowledgement” meaning, arguing that such a meaning is the only way to
maintain the balance between federal and state government. For in-depth summaries
of the three interpretations, see Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless
Pers. Commnc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795-99 (M.D. La. 2004) and Chair King, Inc. v.
GTE Mobilenet of Houston, 135 S.W.3d 365, 374-76 (Tex. App. 2004).
47
47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(1).
42
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an unsolicited faxed advertisement succeeded in showing a
TCPA violation, the sender of the advertisement paid statutory
damages: actual damages or $500 per fax. 48 The penalty
increased to $1500 per fax for those individuals or businesses
willfully or knowingly sending unsolicited advertisements. 49
Again, at the time of enactment, there were no exceptions for
the fax provision, so, theoretically, if a marketer mistakenly
dialed the wrong fax number and transmitted an
advertisement to an unintended consumer, the consumer could
bring an action for $500. 50
The two main reasons set out in the Congressional
reports for such a strict prohibition against fax marketing 51
48

Id. § 227(b)(3)(A)-(C).
Id. § 227(b)(3). This statutory per-fax fine for willful violations can
compound into an extremely expensive judgment if a company knowingly initiates
risky advertising methods. For example, a Georgia judge recently entered a $12
million verdict against a Hooters restaurant for unsolicited faxes. Eric Williamson,
Hooters Hit with $11.9 Million Fee, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 1, 2001, at A07. Hooters
reportedly settled the case for $9 million. Jeremiah Marquez, Court Rulings, Lawsuits
Threaten to Unplug Junk Fax Industry, DETROIT NEWS/ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 6,
2003 (noting that the Hooters award “was later reduced to about $9 million through a
settlement”). Fax.com, a third-party fax blasting company that sent huge volumes of
faxed advertisements on behalf of companies, received the largest FCC-proposed fine in
TCPA history—$5.37 million, or $11,000 for each of the 489 fax violations. In re
Fax.com, Inc., File No. EB-02-TC-120 (FCC 2002) (notice of apparent liability for
forfeiture).
50
As consumer knowledge spread of the TCPA fax provision throughout the
late ‘90s, there were a significant number of class action suits. See Craig Anderson,
Executive Fights Faxes, One at a Time, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 2005, at 3; Lisa Napoli,
Crusaders Against Junk Faxes Brandish Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at C1.
See also http://www.junkfaxorg.com for information on recent and current class action
cases. As a result of the possible immense fines, there have been many challenges by
defendants over the eligibility of class action suits for TCPA violations. Compare
Kaufman v. ACS Sys., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 327 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding class action for
TCPA fax violation permissible), and Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E.2d
468, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that class certification for a TCPA violation was
proper), with Carnett’s Inc. v. Hammond, 610 S.E.2d 529, 532 (Ga. 2005) (denying class
certification for lack of commonality).
51
Most of the TCPA congressional reports are dedicated to telephone issues.
Very little space or emphasis is given to the fax provisions. In the official findings of
the TCPA, “faxes” are not specifically mentioned. See TCPA, supra note 7, § 2.
Although not acknowledging faxes in the opening findings, the TCPA drafters noted in
a legislative report that there were “tens of thousands of unsolicited messages per
week” being sent to “facsimile machines across the country.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at
*6-7 (1991). This is not exactly a compelling number when compared with the fact that
nearly 30 billion pages of faxes were being sent at the time of enactment. Id. at *8. It
may be the case, however, that unsolicited advertisement statistics were not yet
compelling because fax marketing was still a new business. See Destination Ventures,
LTD v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D. Or. 1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 54, 57 (9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that the lack of “specific congressional concern for unsolicited fax
advertising . . . may have more to do with the unprecedented medium of the facsimile
rather than any lack of a substantial interest in the exploitation of that medium”).
Clearly the explosive growth of third-party fax blasting companies in the mid-’90s
49
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were the prevention of cost-shifting and invasion of privacy. 52
The cost-shifting theory is by far the strongest argument for a
complete ban on unsolicited faxed advertisements. 53 Every
time an unsolicited faxed advertisement is sent to a recipient,
the recipient’s machine suffers wear and tear, and the recipient
is left footing the bill for paper and ink. 54 The cost-shifting
justification for the fax provision is sound due to the unique
architecture of faxing technology, of which paper and ink are
essential components. 55
In contrast, the invasion of privacy reasoning applies to
all types of telemarketing, no matter the specific technological
justified Congress’s concern over unsolicited fax advertisements, especially as the fax
machine enjoyed more regular residential use.
Julie Harnett, Host of Fresh
Applications—Advances in Fax Systems, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at 6 (mentioning
“the growth of fax broadcasting which is able to exploit both the unlimited database
capabilities of a computer to target . . . potential customers around the world who have
access to a standard fax machine”).
52
H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10.
53
Courts also supported the view that the cost-shifting feature of fax
technology allowed for a complete ban on faxed advertisements sent without
permission, even in light of the limited First Amendment protection allowed for
commercial speech. The complete ban on unsolicited fax advertisements, as opposed to
the time, place, and manner regulation on telephone solicitations, led to many First
Amendment challenges in courts. See, e.g., Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc.,
323 F.3d 649, 659 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding a substantial government interest in
preventing cost-shifting even if it means “some consumers will not receive unsolicited
advertisements they might have appreciated”); Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 317
(finding the government’s substantial interest in prevention of cost-shifting and
allowing fax machine owners to control their equipment justified the commercial
speech regulations); Destination Ventures Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995)
(no violation of First Amendment); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162,
1169 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (same). Courts also noted other avenues were open to advertisers
other than faxes sent without consent. See, e.g., Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 317
(“[T]he TCPA does not prevent advertisers from marketing their goods and services in
a myriad of ways: television, radio, newspapers, magazines, billboards, mailings, the
Yellow Pages, the Internet, and telephone calls as permitted by law, and faxes to
consenting consumers.”).
There were other unsuccessful constitutional challenges, including the
Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process. See, e.g., Int’l Sci. & Tech.
Inst. v. Inacom Comm’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1156-58 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
TCPA’s exclusive state court jurisdiction violated neither the Tenth Amendment nor
the “equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”);
Kenro, Inc., 92 F. Supp. at 1166 (holding that the $500 per fax statutory fine is not
severe or oppressive enough to violate Due Process); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilenet
of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 385 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding the TCPA did not
exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power); Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325 (rejecting
advertiser defendants’ “void-for-vagueness” arguments).
54
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10. See also infra discussion in Part V.B.
55
There has been an argument that modern fax computer programs which
allow for faxes to arrive directly to a computer desktop instead of printing
automatically at a fax machine weaken the cost-shifting theory. See infra discussion in
Part V.B.
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features, and thus, is Congress’s threshold argument for the
TCPA’s enactment as a whole. 56 When considering the TCPA
as a whole, Congress seemed to view the telemarketing
industry’s invasion of privacy as an attack of a fundamental
right—the right not to receive unexpected, intrusive phone
calls from solicitors. 57 When presenting the invasion of privacy
issue as it applied specifically to the fax provision, however,
Congress viewed the invasion of privacy in a slightly different
sense. The privacy right thought to be infringed by unsolicited
junk faxes was that of the recipient to use and control his or
her own machine. By protecting this right, Congress sought to
prevent junk faxes from impeding or prohibiting the
transmission of consumers’ legitimate business faxes. 58 Hence,
even the invasion of privacy argument for prohibiting
unsolicited faxed advertisements had an underlying economic
theme.
That is not to say the “fundamental right” privacy
interest would not apply to the fax provisions, even if Congress
did not specifically address them as such in the legislative
history. The same fundamental right to privacy interest
Congress attaches in its report to automated telephone calls—
not being able to interact with the caller or not allowing the
caller to feel the frustration of the called party 59 —can be easily
applied to unsolicited faxed advertisements. 60 Further, several
courts later interpreting the policies behind the fax provisions
of the TCPA supported the idea that unsolicited faxes were
invasions of privacy, apart from impeding commerce. 61
56

S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1969 (1991) (citing the first purpose of the bill is to
“protect the privacy interests”).
57
Id. at 1977 (“The Supreme Court has recognized explicitly that the right to
privacy is founded in the Constitution, and telemarketers who place telephone calls to
the home can be considered ‘intruders’ upon that privacy.”).
58
H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10 (noting that an unsolicited faxed
advertisement “occupies the recipient’s [sic] facsimile machine so that it is unavailable
for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax”).
59
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1972 n.3 (citing comments from a consumer
advocate that “slamming a phone down on a computer just does not have the same
sense of release” compared to hanging up on a live in-person operator).
60
See Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 657 n.5 (8th Cir.
2003) (“Artificial or prerecorded messages, like a faxed advertisement, were believed to
have heightened intrusiveness because they are unable to interact with the customer
except in preprogrammed ways.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
61
See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Lou Fusz Auto. Network, 401
F.3d 876, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding unsolicited faxes were an “injury” within the
meaning of an insurance contract because they invaded insured’s privacy); Adler v.
Vision Lab Telecomms., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2005) (suggesting that a
recipient who continually sends unsolicited faxes might be subject to a tort invasion of
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Thus, Congress had two distinct policy reasons
supporting the strict anti-junk fax provisions: preventing
unfair cost-shifting from businesses to consumers and limiting
invasion of consumer privacy. As this Note discusses in Part V,
these two goals complement the history and modern
development of consumer protection law.
III.

THE ESTABLISHED BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTIONS

A.

Creation of the EBR Exception

There are three “established business relationship”
(“EBR”) exceptions related to the TCPA, each with its own
distinct origin.
There is the telephone solicitation EBR
exception (“Telephone EBR”) that originates from the TCPA
statute language, 62 the artificial and pre-recorded telephone
solicitation EBR exception (“Artificial/Pre-Recorded EBR”) that
derives from an FCC memo, 63 and the Fax EBR that derives
from a brief footnote in an FCC memo.64 Each will be discussed
in turn.
The “established business relationship” made its initial
appearance in an early House of Representatives version of the
TCPA as part of the definition of “unsolicited advertisement.”
If that version had passed, the EBR would have been an
exception for advertisements made via telephone and fax. 65
The finished version of the TCPA, however, explicitly limited
the EBR exception to telephone solicitations only:
The term “telephone solicitation” means the initiation of a telephone
call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental
of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is
transmitted to any person, but such terms do not include a call or
message
privacy action); Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979 (D.
Minn. 2002) (noting that a plaintiff who kept a fax machine at home for personal and
business use “received fax advertisements between 4:15 a.m. and 7:15 a.m., intruding
upon her privacy”); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilenet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d
365, 395 (Tex. App. 2004) (“[S]ending unauthorized fax advertising may constitute
invasion of privacy in some circumstances.”).
62
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2000).
63
1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 18-20.
64
Id. at 28 n.87.
65
This is because “unsolicited advertisement” was a term that appeared in
the fax provision. As originally enacted, the fax provision did not prohibit all faxed
advertisements from being sent; it prohibited the sending of an unsolicited
advertisement without prior express invitation or permission. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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(A) to any person with that person’s prior express
invitation or permission,
(B) to any person with whom the caller has an established
business relationship, or
(C) by a tax exempt nonprofit organization. 66

Congress did not define “established business
relationship” in the statute. 67 The FCC subsequently created a
definition of “established business relationship” in its initial
1992 rulemaking memo:
The term “established business relationship” means a prior or
existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication
between a person or entity and a residential subscriber with or
without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry,
application, purchase, or transaction by the residential subscriber
regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, and
relationship has not been previously terminated by either party. 68

The Telephone EBR was the only reference to an established
business relationship in the TCPA when it was signed into
law. 69
By contrast, the Artificial/Pre-Recorded EBR did not
originate in the TCPA language. 70 The TCPA language did,
however, order the FCC to implement rules in conjunction with
the TCPA provisions on calls using artificial or pre-recorded
voices. 71 Specifically, the FCC had to consider two possible
exemption groups to the prohibition against pre-recorded calls:
(1) calls that were not made for a commercial purpose and (2)
calls that were made for a commercial purpose but that did not
adversely affect the privacy rights the TCPA was intended to
protect and did not include the transmission of any unsolicited

66

47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).
See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1975-76 (1991).
68
1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 42. The FCC specifically rejected a
company-specific list as part of the EBR definition (such as allowing “public utilities” to
be automatically exempted) and rather adopted a broad enough definition to include
most businesses. Id. at 19-20. The FCC also decided not to include a time limit for the
expiration of an EBR. Id. at 20. Further, the FCC rejected narrowing the EBR to a
current business relationship, thereby making a prior business relationship a
qualifying EBR. Id. at 20. An EBR, however, ceased to exist at the request of the
consumer. Id. at 20. The broad language of this definition is further discussed infra in
Part V.
69
See generally TCPA, supra note 7.
70
1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 18-20.
71
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).
67
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advertisement. 72 Based on these orders, in its initial 1992 rulemaking TCPA memo, the FCC determined that it was feasible
to extend the established business relationship exemption to
pre-recorded commercial calls because the exemption met
According to the FCC’s
Congress’s necessary criteria. 73
analysis, using pre-recorded calls to solicit someone with whom
one has a prior or existing business relationship does not
adversely affect privacy interests of the called party. 74 The
FCC further determined pre-recorded commercial calls based
on an established business relationship could not include an
unsolicited advertisement because the advertisement “can be
deemed to be invited or permitted by a subscriber in light of the
business relationship.” 75 Equating an established business
relationship with permission to send advertisements seems a
wrong conclusion, however, given that the statutory provision
defining telephone solicitation presents an established business
relationship and prior express permission as two distinct
exemptions. 76
The Fax EBR’s origin is much humbler by comparison;
it came to life in a footnote of the same 1992 FCC memo. 77 The
only explanation for the FCC extending its already extended
exception to include unsolicited faxed advertisements is a
reference to its previous—and, arguably, erroneous—discussion
involving pre-recorded phone calls. 78 Ironically, in the same
footnote, the sentence before the one announcing the Fax EBR
states, “In banning telephone facsimile advertisements, the
TCPA leaves the Commission without discretion to create
exemptions from or limit the effects of the prohibition . . . .” 79
Nevertheless, for almost a decade, the courts fully embraced

72

Id. § 227(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 19.
74
Id. The FCC memo makes no further explanation of exactly how this does
not constitute an invasion of privacy. Id.
75
Id.
76
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3)(A)-(B) (“Telephone solicitation . . . does not include a
call or message . . . to any person with that person’s prior express invitation or
permission” or “to any person with whom the caller has an established business
relationship . . . .”).
77
1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 28 n.87 (“We note, however, that
facsimile transmission from persons or entities who have an established business
relationship with the recipient can be deemed to be invited or permitted by the
recipient.”).
78
Id.
79
Id. (emphasis added).
73
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the FCC-created Fax EBR as a legitimate exception to the
TCPA’s ban on unsolicited faxed advertisements. 80
B.

Why the Fax EBR Should Have Never Existed

The FCC should have never created the Fax EBR
because it was never Congress’s intent to include one. This is
clear for two reasons. First, the TCPA legislative history
explicitly rejected a Fax EBR. 81 Second, the FCC-created Fax
EBR is contrary to the language of the TCPA. 82
The legislative history supports the argument that
Congress never intended to create a Fax EBR. Congress
specifically rejected adopting an EBR exception as part of the
definition of unsolicited advertisement, which would affect both
telephones and faxes, and, instead, chose to limit its use to
telephone solicitations only. 83
Second, the Fax EBR is contrary to the language of the
TCPA. The TCPA prohibits using a fax machine to send an
The definition of unsolicited
unsolicited advertisement. 84
advertisement is one that is “without that person’s prior
Therefore, the FCC’s
express invitation or permission.” 85
conclusion that the Fax EBR is sufficient because it indicates
an inferred or implied permission contradicts Congress’s
requirement that the permission be “express.”
Further
evidence of Congress’s intent not to create any exemptions for
its strict prohibition against unsolicited faxed advertisements
is the fact that it did not include language asking the
Commission to consider implementing rules regarding one, as
it had for pre-recorded calls. 86
Two recent court cases raised this express-inferred issue
as well. In Carnett’s, Inc. v. Hammond, 87 plaintiff Michelle
Hammond brought a class action suit in Georgia against a car
wash company, which had hired an ad agent to fax 73,500
80
See Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns,
L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 808 (M.D. La. 2004) (noting the FCC’s “longstanding
interpretation” of its established business relationship exception lasted more than ten
years); McGarry v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 599 S.E.2d 34, 36-37 (Ga. App. 2004)
(noting the long history of the FCC’s established business relationship exception).
81
See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
82
See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
83
See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
84
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (2000).
85
Id. § 227(a)(1)(4) (emphasis added).
86
See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
87
610 S.E.2d 529 (Ga. 2005).
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unsolicited advertisements to Atlanta-area residents, including
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
Hammond. 88
appellate court’s finding that there was no evidence that the
car wash company had express permission to fax the
recipients. 89 The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed regarding
the lack of permission, citing the possibility that some of the
recipients had an “established business relationship” with the
local car wash. 90 Hammond argued that the established
business relationship exemption did not exist because it was
“contrary to the clear statutory language of the TCPA.” 91 The
court, however, said it had an obligation to accept FCC
regulations as valid. 92
In Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 93
a Texas appellate court appeared more open to the language
argument against allowing a Fax EBR exemption. In Chair
King, the plaintiff was a customer of the defendant, who had
sent unsolicited faxes to the plaintiff. 94 The court openly
questioned the soundness of the FCC’s established business
It noted that deeming permission on an
relationship. 95
inference seemed to conflict with the TCPA’s requirement of
express permission. 96 The court continued by forcefully stating
that “[c]haracterizing permission granted by implication as
‘express’ runs afoul of the plain meaning of the word.” 97
Ultimately, the court determined plaintiff had raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether he gave prior express
invitation or permission. 98
Finally, the TCPA definition of telephone solicitation
offers a choice between an established business relationship
and express permission. 99 This statutory distinction shows
that Congress did not see an established business relationship
and permission as interrelated options. 100 Thus, the legislative
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 531.
Carnett’s, Inc., 610 S.E.2d at 531.
135 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App. 2004).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id.
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2000).
Id. See supra discussion in Part III.A.
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history and language of the TCPA support the argument that
the FCC erroneously created the Fax EBR. It was the
distinction between express and inferred permission, coupled
with continuing consumer complaints about cost and privacy,
that persuaded the FCC to eliminate the Fax EBR more than a
decade after the agency had created it in a memo footnote. 101
IV.

THE JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005 LEGITIMIZES
THE FAX EBR EXCEPTION

A.

History and Passing of the Junk Fax Prevention Act of
2005

In July 2003, the FCC released a sweeping 164-page
study on the TCPA rules it had enacted during the past
decade. 102 As part of this overhaul, in addition to announcing
plans to implement a national do-not-call registry, the FCC
reversed its stance on the Fax EBR it created in its 1992 initial
In making this decision, the FCC
rule-making memo. 103
emphasized that it wished to prohibit cost-shifting from the
advertiser to the consumer, as well as to limit the intrusiveness
of unsolicited faxed advertisements. 104 In particular, the FCC
found that consumers paid out of pocket not only for wasted ink
and paper but also for lost labor costs. 105 In this same memo,
the FCC maintained the Telephone EBR because it did not
impose the same type of costs as faxing technology. The FCC,
however, decided to put a time limit on the Telephone EBR,
ruling that a Telephone EBR expires eighteen months after the
last purchase or three months after a consumer’s last inquiry
about a product. 106 In support of narrowing the Telephone EBR
definition, the FCC cited “confused and even frustrated”

101

2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 112-15.
See generally 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2.
103
Id. at 4.
104
Id. at 111-12 (noting consumers’ additional burden of “time spent reading
and disposing of faxes, the time the machine is printing an advertisement and is not
operational for other purposes, and the intrusiveness of faxes transmitted at
inconvenient times, including in the middle of the night”). One court rejected a
defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim should fail because
plaintiff should have turned his fax machine off at night to avoid interruptions. Adler
v. Vision Lab Telecomms., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 n.11 (D.D.C. 2005).
105
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 111-12 (noting time spent collecting and
sorting faxes increases labor costs).
106
Id. at 65.
102
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consumers who receive phone calls from companies they have
not contacted or done business with for many years. 107
When the FCC reported the elimination of the Fax EBR,
it announced that “prior express invitation or permission” must
be shown through a written, signed statement that lists the fax
number to which the consent refers. 108 In other words, every
business that wanted to engage in sending unsolicited faxed
advertisements would need to collect signed, written consent
before beginning any fax marketing campaign.
The
elimination of the Fax EBR exemption was set to take effect on
August 25, 2003—just thirty days after the FCC’s rules first
appeared in the Federal Register. 109
Understandably, members of the business community
were concerned about the cost and time it would take to collect
signed, written consent. In response, the FCC delayed the
implementation of the Fax EBR elimination until January 1,
2005 to allow businesses ample time to adjust to the new
regulations. 110 By the time January 1, 2005 arrived, trade
organizations had begun to lobby Congress, which started work
on what would later pass as the Junk Fax Prevention Act. 111 In
light of this impending legislation, the FCC agreed, once more,
to extend the Fax EBR elimination to July 1, 2005. 112
In early April 2005, Representative Gordon Smith (DOR) introduced the Junk Fax Prevention Act to the Senate, and
the Senate then referred the bill to the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 113 With the FCC’s
elimination of the Fax EBR and its rule of signed, written
consent set to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Junk Fax
Prevention Act earned Senate and House approval at lightning

107

Id.
Id. at 112. Interestingly, Congress specifically rejected a written consent
requirement for “prior express consent” in relation to automated telephone calls in the
TCPA legislative history. S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1971 (1991) (“[T]he reported bill does
not include the requirement included in the bill as introduced the requirement that
any consent to receiving an automated call be in writing.”).
109
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 128 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 4 (2005).
110
FCC, FCC 03-208, ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION, RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 3 (2003),
reprinted in 68 Fed. Reg. 50,978 (Aug. 18, 2003).
111
Effective Date Delayed, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,816 (Oct. 28, 2004).
112
Id. (“[W]e believe the public interest would best be served by delaying the
effective date of the written consent requirement for six months to allow Congress to
act.”).
113
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 7.
108

2006]

FAXING IT IN

363

speed. 114 In fact, the House—which had a heavy hand in
shaping the original TCPA legislation 115 —did not meaningfully
debate any aspect of the Junk Fax Prevention Act. 116 The
House introduced and passed the bill by voice vote in less than
a half-hour. 117 Despite the House’s hurried efforts to meet the
FCC’s July 1 deadline, the bill had yet to be signed by
President George W. Bush (and thus was still not law), so the
FCC delayed the effective date—again—from July 1, 2005 until
January 9, 2006. 118 Finally, President George W. Bush signed
the Junk Fax Prevention Act on July 9, 2005, thus amending
and undermining the extensive consumer protection legislation
signed by his father, George H.W. Bush. 119
B.

Congress’s New Version of “Established Business
Relationship”—The Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005’s
New Consent Requirements

The Junk Fax Prevention Act’s main effect is to make
the Fax EBR a statutory exemption against the sending of
unsolicited faxed advertisements. 120 The Junk Fax Prevention
Act’s statutory definition of Fax EBR reverts to the broad
definition found in the 1992 FCC memo. 121 Congress explicitly
did not adopt the 2003 revised Telephone EBR, which included
a time limit on the established business relationship. 122 But
114
For a summary of the bill’s history on the Library of Congress’s website,
visit http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN00714:@@@X.
115
The House had introduced one of the bills incorporated into the final
TCPA. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
116
See generally 151 CONG. REC. H5262-65 (daily ed. June 28, 2005). Only the
bill’s three co-sponsors spoke about the Junk Fax Prevention Act. No senator
expressed dissenting or critical opinions. Id. The House did have a more active role in
a previous Fax EBR bill in 2004 that failed to become law. Id. at H5264.
117
Id. at H5261-67 (recording the bill’s passing between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00
a.m. on June 28, 2005). This was just two days before the effective date of the FCC’s
elimination of the Fax EBR. See supra notes 111-12.
118
Effective Date Delayed, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,705 (June 30, 2005). The Junk
Fax Prevention Act of 2005 would pass just nine days after this announcement.
119
President Signs Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, FED. INFO. AND NEWS
DISPATCH, July 11, 2005.
120
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 1 (2005) (citing its first purpose as to “[c]reate a
limited statutory exception” for Fax EBRs).
121
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(b) (ordering the definition of
established business relationship to revert back to the meaning before the one enacted
by the 2003 FCC Memo).
122
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10 (“[T]his provision would specifically exclude the
18/3 time limits that are in the current definition of ‘established business relationship’
in the C.F.R. . . . Therefore, the effect would be to reinstate the junk fax rules back to
the FCC’s original interpretation established in 1992.”).
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the Junk Fax Prevention Act adds additional limitations to the
EBR exception, including the method in which the sender
The Junk Fax
obtained the recipient’s fax number. 123
Prevention Act requires that the fax number be obtained either
through
(I) the voluntary communication of such number, within the context
of such established business relationship, from the recipient of the
unsolicited advertisement, or
(II) a directory, advertisement, or site on the Internet to which the
recipient voluntarily agreed to make available its facsimile number
for public distribution [except that this clause does not apply to
numbers collected as part of an EBR before the Junk Fax Prevention
Act enactment.] 124

Thus, if a fax sender and recipient fall within the broad,
no-time limit Fax EBR definition, the sender may fax
unsolicited advertisements if the recipient gave the sender the
fax number pursuant to a business inquiry or transaction or if
the fax number is otherwise made public. 125
As part of the statutory Fax EBR exemption, the Junk
Fax Prevention Act sets out several compliance requirements.
In an attempt to balance the needs of consumers and
businesses, the Junk Fax Prevention Act now requires
advertisers wishing to send an unsolicited faxed advertisement
based on an EBR between sender and recipient to include
identification information on the front page of a fax, including
name of sender and telephone or fax information for consumers
to opt out of future unsolicited faxes. 126 Specifically, senders
must offer at least one cost-free mechanism available twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week for consumers to make optThe opt-out notice also must include a
out requests. 127
123

Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(a).
Id.
125
See infra discussion in Part V.A on why this “public distribution” fax
number provision weakens consumer protection.
126
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c). For a discussion on why this
unfairly puts the burden on consumers, see infra Part.V.
127
It is unclear from the statutory language whether an email address or
website would constitute a cost-free mechanism. As part of its rules implementing the
Junk Fax Prevention Act, the FCC stated that an email address or website would
satisfy the cost-free requirement. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION FCC-06-42,
RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
OF 1991 15-16 (2006), reprinted in 71 Fed. Reg. 25, 967 (May 3, 2006), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/policy/faxadvertising.html. Also, the Junk Fax Prevention Act
orders the FCC to determine whether small businesses should be able to forgo the costfree mechanism requirement due to small businesses’ heavy reliance on faxed
124
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statement telling the recipient that consumers may opt out of
future unsolicited advertisements and that it is unlawful for
fax senders to not timely comply with opt-out requests. 128
Another change in consent that the Junk Fax
Prevention Act makes is a small but telling one. Now, the
definition of unsolicited advertisement refers to an ad
transmitted without the recipient’s “prior express invitation or
permission, in writing or otherwise.” 129 The addition of “in
writing or otherwise” shows Congress deemed verbal consent
sufficient. Therefore, Congress rejected the FCC’s written,
signed consent rule. 130
Thus, Congress’s Fax EBR is a slightly more specific
exemption than the FCC’s 1992 Fax EBR in that Congress
attempted to narrow the Fax EBR’s definition by limiting the
source of fax numbers senders may use pursuant to a Fax
EBR. 131 In a seemingly contradictory move to narrowing the
definition, however, Congress refused to adopt an expiration
date for the Fax EBR. 132 Another difference from the FCC’s
Fax EBR is Congress’s notice requirements to educate
consumers about their right to refuse future junk faxes using
cost-free mechanisms. 133 Despite the consumer-friendly opt-out
notices, however, Congress’s version of the Fax EBR does little
to protect consumers from cost-shifting and invasions of
privacy. 134

advertisements. S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10. The “cost-free” mechanism is arguably the
only consumer-friendly part of the legislation. To allow small businesses to be exempt
from the cost-free mechanism would undermine consumer protection even more than
the Junk Fax Prevention Act does as it passed because small businesses are likely to
rely on junk fax as the preferred advertising method of choice because it is more costeffective. Id. at 3 (“Industry comments maintained that ‘faxing is a cost-effective way
to reach customers’ particularly for small business from whom faxing is a cheaper way
to advertise.”).
128
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c) (“[T]he notice states that the
recipient may make a request to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement not to
send any future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or
machines and that failure to comply, within the shortest reasonable time, as
determined by the Commission, with such a request . . . is unlawful.”).
129
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(g) (emphasis added).
130
See infra discussion in Part V.
131
See infra text accompanying notes 161-63 for why the “limit” on source of
fax numbers is not an effective limit.
132
See supra note 122.
133
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c)
134
See infra discussion in Part V.
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DISCUSSION—WHY THE JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT
FAILS AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE TCPA

Consumers should not be misled by the cleverly titled
amendment. The Junk Fax Prevention Act does little to
prevent the junk faxes that the TCPA strictly prohibited. This
is due to Congress’s broad, no-expiration definition of Fax EBR,
its reliance on a company-specific opt-out provision that
continues to shift costs to consumers, and its decision to allow
for the collection of numbers based on a Fax EBR from public
Additionally, the cost-shifting effects of a
databases. 135
facsimile machine’s unique technology remain today, even in
light of new, computer-based faxing capabilities. 136 This new
federal law also puts state laws offering stronger protection
against junk faxing in jeopardy. 137 Finally, Congress could
have struck a better balance between consumer and business
needs by showing more deference to the FCC and its decision to
eliminate an exception of its own creation because the FCC had
more first-hand experience dealing with and spent more time
studying the issue. 138
A.

Congress’s Broad, No-Expiration Fax EBR Weakens The
Strong Consumer Protection Set Out In The TCPA

The history of modern state and federal consumer
protection law stems from the desire to shield consumers from
economic loss as a result of deception, fraud or other abuses in
commerce. 139 For example, consumer protection law guards
against a used car salesman who turns the odometer back to
make an auto seem to have less wear-and-tear. 140 Gradually,
135

See infra discussion in Part V.A.
See infra discussion in Part V.B.
137
See infra discussion in Part V.C.
138
See infra discussion in Part V.D.
139
See Spencer Weber Waller, In Search of Economic Justice: Considering
Competition and Consumer Protection Law, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 633 (2005) (noting
modern consumer protection covers unfair advertising, “outright fraud,” consumer
credit, and debt collection, among other things).
140
Jones v. West Side Buick Auto Co., 231 Mo. App. 187, 195-96 (1936). See,
e.g., Hebe Co. v. Calvert, 246 F. 711, 716-17 (S.D. Ohio 1917) (upholding state’s ability
to protect consumers from deceptively labeled milk). In 1938, Congress amended the
Federal Trade Commission’s responsibilities to include regulation of unfair and
deceptive trade practices. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111. For an indepth history of the Federal Trade Commission, see Mark Winerman, The Origins of
the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1
(2003).
136
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the doctrine of consumer protection law expanded from solely
economic protection to protections against business methods
that constituted nuisance 141 and threatened privacy, 142
including marketing techniques. For example, in Breard v.
Alexander, 143 the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that
prohibited door-to-door commercial solicitation without prior
consent. 144 The ordinance originated from unhappy citizens
who deemed such commercial visits an “uninvited intrusion
into the privacy of their home.” 145 While the Court decided this
case before commercial speech received First Amendment
protection 146 in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 147 the Court never shied away
from the idea that a citizen’s privacy is a valid interest for

141
Larson v. State, 97 So. 2d 776, 786, 789-91 (Ala. 1957) (upholding an
injunction against loan creditors’ business practice deemed to be a public nuisance).
142
Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that city transit system policy of forbidding political
advertisements on city buses should be upheld because “the right of the commuters to
be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its
vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this
captive audience”). In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ Harvard Law Review
article famously drew early attention to the issue of privacy by calling for a new tort
action for invasion of privacy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (“Recent inventions and business methods call
attention to the next step that must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right ‘to be let alone.’”). For
historical significance of this article, see Daniel J. Solove, The Origins and Growth of
Information Privacy, 838 PLI/Pat 23, 34-35 (May-June 2005).
143
341 U.S. 622 (1951), overturned by Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 641-45 (1980).
144
Breard, 341 U.S. at 625.
145
Id. The Court noted that, “[t]here is equal unanimity that opportunists, for
private gain, cannot be permitted to arm themselves with an acceptable principle, such
as that of a right to work, a privilege to engage in interstate commerce, or a free press,
and proceed to use it as an iron standard to smooth their path by crushing the living
rights of others to privacy and repose.” Id. at 625-26.
146
The Court refused to hear a First Amendment argument against the city
ordinance, saying “[o]nly the press and oral advocates of ideas could urge this point. It
was not open to solicitors of gadgets and brushes.” Id. at 641.
147
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding a consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information was entitled to First Amendment protection). The Court later
clarified that commercial speech receives a limited First Amendment protection that
must only pass intermediate scrutiny. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). Recent members of the Court have
questioned the logic in offering less protection based on the commercial content of
speech, suggesting that it receive full First Amendment protection. See Adam Zitter,
Note, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2794-96 (2004) (discussing recent Supreme Court commercial
speech cases).
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states to protect through legislation 148 or that commercial
speech is subject to privacy limitations. 149 Thus, the two main
policies behind the TCPA fax regulations—cost-shifting and
privacy—complemented the development of consumer
protection law. 150 The drafters of the Junk Fax Prevention Act
should not have blatantly brushed off such well-established
policies in favor of making it easier for businesses to market
their products through a particular method.
There are several ways Congress brushed off consumer
protection policies. First, the drafters refused to adopt a time
limit for the Fax EBR. Congress chose to keep its Fax EBR
similar to the original 1992 FCC definition. 151 This language—
“interaction” or “application”—is broad enough to encompass
almost any consumer interaction, past or present, with a
business. 152 When coupled with the fact that this interaction or
application could have conceivably happened twenty years ago
and still count as a Fax EBR, it severely cuts against any
consumer protection rhetoric in the law’s title. Not having any
time limit on a broad definition clearly did not suit the
Telephone EBR, which is why the FCC chose in 2003 to limit
the Telephone EBR to eighteen months from last purchase or
Again,
three months from the last consumer inquiry. 153

148
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (“The State’s interest in
protecting the well-being, tranquility and privacy of the home is certainly of the
highest order in a free and civilized society.”). For purposes of this footnote, the term
“privacy” refers to privacy as a fundamental right that emerged through Constitutional
doctrine and not to the tort of intrusion against seclusion.
149
These privacy limitations on commercial speech are usually referred to as
“time, place, and manner” restrictions. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748:

In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of
course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way. Some forms of
commercial speech regulation are surely permissible . . . . There is no claim,
for example, that the prohibition on prescription drug price advertising is a
mere time, place, and manner restriction.
We have often approved
restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.
Id. at 770-71.
150
See supra text accompanying notes 51-62.
151
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10 (“[T]he effect would be to reinstate the junk fax
rules back to the FCC’s original interpretation established in 1992. . . .”).
152
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
153
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 65-66. Compare 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4)
(2002), with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(3) (2003).
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Congress explicitly rejected adopting the time limit for the Fax
EBR. 154
A second example of how Congress ignored consumer
protection policies is its choice to include a company-specific
opt-out mechanism. 155 Supporters of the Junk Fax Prevention
Act are likely point to the opt-out provision and its required
cost-free mechanism as an indication of Congress’s desire to
protect consumers. 156 While it is true that giving consumers
the power to more effectively identify their purported
unsolicited fax origins is consumer friendly, allowing companyspecific opt-out lists still unfairly shifts costs to consumers
because it allows for that first fax to clog up their machines and
to waste their ink and paper. 157 This is in addition to the labor
costs and nuisances involved in contacting each sender to be
removed from lists. 158 Ironically, Congress found that allowing
company-specific do-not-call lists failed to protect consumers
from invasive telemarketing calls and enacted a law to create a
national do-not-call registry. 159 It is unclear why Congress
thought a company-specific list would be effective for faxes. 160
154

S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10. But Congress did give the FCC the authority to
examine at a later date whether a time limit would be appropriate. Junk Fax
Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(f).
155
See Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c).
156
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 7 (noting the new law provides a cost-free
mechanism so recipients would be able “to stop future unwanted faxes sent pursuant to
[a Fax EBR]”).
157
See Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. 01-0004360,
2003 LEXIS 29, *11 (D.C. Super. Apr. 17, 2003) (rejecting a company-specific do-notfax approach because it would “still allow a fax advertiser to send one fax to every fax
number for which the recipient would have to bear the cost. Moreover, the consumer
would still have to bear the cost and the burden of receiving at least on [sic] fax and
then contacting the sender of the unsolicited fax to be removed from the database. As
we have seen from this case, this may still not immediately stop the unwanted faxes”).
158
This is because the Junk Fax Prevention Act opt-out provision is companyspecific, not a national registry. Junk fax recipients must contact each Fax EBR
sender individually. See Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c).
159
Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-8, 117 Stat. 557 (2003)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. III 2003)).
160
One recent case pointedly shows such company-specific do-not-fax lists are
not effective. Covington & Burling, 2003 LEXIS 29, at *2 (noting that, after plaintiff
asked to be removed from defendant’s lists, plaintiff “received 172 fax advertisements
for vacation packages . . . and 104 fax advertisements for laser printer supplies. . . .
[The next day plaintiff] received 147 more fax advertisements for vacation packages”).
Ironically, the government—as an intervener in a TCPA fax case—has made this exact
argument against company-specific fax lists. See Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v.
Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 817 (M.D. La. 2004) (explaining
government’s contention that do-not-fax lists would not eliminate cost-shifting of
unwanted faxes, would unfairly burden the consumer to contact each fax advertiser
and would put the burden on consumers to prove they had requested to be removed
from a company’s fax marketing list). In addition to shifting ink and paper costs to
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Finally, Congress’s “limit” on sources of fax numbers
contradicts any notion of consumer protection. 161 Congress’s
new definition of EBR limits how an EBR sender can collect the
fax number of a recipient. It gives senders two options: either
collect the number from the recipient within the context of the
established business relationship or find the number in a
directory, on a website or any other public place. 162 Thus,
according to the second option, a business which publishes its
fax number on a website for the purposes of legitimate business
exposes itself to more unwanted faxes. This is in direct
contrast to the TCPA’s purpose of facilitating interstate
commerce by prohibiting unsolicited faxed advertisements from
interfering with “legitimate business messages.” 163 By allowing
senders to collect fax numbers outside of the context of the
established business relationship, Congress has helped make it
easier for businesses to send unsolicited faxes.
Thus,
Congress’s version of the Fax EBR in the Junk Fax Prevention
Act weakens consumer protection instead of enhancing it.
B.

Faxing Deserves Stricter Telemarketing Policies Due to
Its Unique Technological Features

As made clear in the legislative history of the TCPA,
faxing technology deserves a broader ban on marketing than
other methods due to the technology that sends and receives
Proponents of the Junk Fax Prevention Act argue
faxes. 164
that the cost-shifting policy is outdated due to improvements in
faxing technology, but this technology remains largely
unchanged today in the sense that a fax must still be printed
recipients, do-not-fax lists do not completely prevent unwanted faxes from interrupting
legitimate messages. See Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282 F. Supp. 2d 976,
984 (D. Minn. 2002) (rejecting the creation of a do-not-fax list due to the fact that even
one unwanted fax “can prevent the receipt of wanted faxes”).
161
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(a).
162
Id.
163
H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10.
164
See supra text accompanying notes 10, 53 and 58. Other methods such as
telephone and email do not present as strong of a case for cost-shifting as faxing. For
example, marketing via telephone does not cause paper or ink costs to the called party.
It is for cost-shifting reasons that cell phones are explicitly banned from calls made
with autodialing systems or artificial or prerecorded voice programs. See 47 U.S.C. §
227 (b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000). For email, a recipient of unwanted email spam controls which
message to print. Spam, however, can raise cost-shifting concerns for corporations or
server owners when the totality of spam overwhelms computer systems. Adam Zitter,
Note, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2777 (2004) (noting one recent study reported U.S.
corporations spend $8.9 billion a year fighting spam).

2006]

FAXING IT IN

371

out at a cost—in terms of paper, ink and time—to the
recipient. 165 Defenders of maintaining the Fax EBR also point
to the fact that modern fax machines are capable of receiving
and storing in the machine’s memory more than one message,
and thus there is no interruption of legitimate business faxes
while an unsolicited faxed advertisement prints. 166 This theory
fails, however, in every-day application due to the disruption
that occurs as a result of server delays caused by overfilled
memory. 167
This is not to suggest that there has been no
advancement in terms of faxing technology. Today, faxes can
be sent as either an attachment to emails or transmitted to fax
servers 168 or personal computers equipped with modems. A fax
sent as an email attachment instead of directly to a fax
165
The FCC as late as 2003 found that fax machines, although faster in terms
of processing messages, still required paper to be printed for each message. 2003 FCC
Memo, supra note 2, at 118-20. Furthermore, the U.S. government as late as 2002
defended the constitutionality of the TCPA fax provision by arguing that the law is best
viewed “as an anti-conversion statute because its purpose is to prevent the shifting of
advertising costs (paper, toner, human resources, business disruption), from the
advertiser to the recipient of the advertising.” Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282 F.
Supp. 2d at 981.
166
See, e.g., Comments of Nextel Communications, In the Matter of Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket
No. 02-278, at 30-31, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native
_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513396853:

When the TCPA was passed in 1991, the vast majority of faxes were sent and
received by stand-alone thermal paper telephone fax machines. These analog
devices had no scanning or receiving memory, operated at slow data transfer
speeds, tied up telephone lines for significant periods of time, and consumed
expensive thermal paper with every transmission. These considerations lay
at the heart of both Congress’ decision to regulate fax advertising and its
constitutional justification for doing so. Since the passage of the TCPA,
however, data transfer speeds have increased and transmission times have
decreased dramatically. Plain-paper fax technology has obviated the need for
costly thermal paper. Most important, fax modem technology now enables
the delivery of faxes to email inboxes where consumers can electronically
retrieve, view or discard a fax image without ever reducing it to paper.
Id.
167
How many pages a fax machine will store in its memory vary from twenty
to two hundred pages, depending on the model and manufacturer. Scott Cullen, Fax
Buying Tips, OFFICE DEALER AND OFFICE SOLUTIONS, Nov. 1, 2003, at 10 (“The number
of pages a fax can store in memory is based on a standard test page with minimal
amount of text. For text or graphics-intensive documents, 200 pages of memory may in
reality only allow you to store 100 or fewer pages in memory.”). Courts have also noted
that modern fax machines are not sufficient to fight the onslaught of junk fax
transmissions. See, e.g., Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 653
(8th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with plaintiff’s argument that technological changes have not
eliminated burdens imposed on recipients of unwanted fax advertising).
168
Fax servers enable multiple computers to send and receive faxes from the
same or shared number. 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 119.
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machine is received instantly, which saves time and cost
because it allows recipients to see the fax before deciding
whether to print it. The FCC, however, in its 2003 memo
overhauling the TCPA, clarified that its TCPA rules do not
apply to fax advertisements sent as email attachments, 169 so
faxes sent as email attachments are irrelevant to a TCPA
analysis.
According to the same 2003 FCC memo, the TCPA does
govern faxes sent to “personal computers equipped with, or
attached to, modems and to computerized fax servers.” 170 Some
businesses contend that fax server and desktop faxing
technology do not raise the same cost-shifting issue as a
conventional stand-alone fax machine because not every
message from a fax server and personal computer is
automatically printed. 171 The FCC disagreed, however, finding
the totality of harm—the cost of paper and toner if the message
is printed, the possibility that faxes will tie up modem or fax
server lines, 172 and increased labor costs for monitoring which
faxes were legitimate—justified subjecting personal computers
and fax servers to TCPA regulations. 173 Further, and more
persuasively, the FCC argued that there is no way to indicate
which type of faxing technology the recipient owns. 174 There is
no distinction in the numerical coding of fax numbers to
indicate whether a fax sent to a recipient will go to a fax server
or a traditional, cost-shifting machine. 175
169
Id. at 119 n.736 (noting that this type of transmission does not fit the
definition of ‘telephone facsimile machine’ at 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2)).
170
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 119.
171
Id. (“Nextel maintains that such faxes do not implicate the harms that
Congress sought to redress in the TCPA, as they are not reduced to paper can be
deleted from one’s inbox without being opened or examined.”).
172
See, e.g., Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers.
Commc’ns., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 815 (M.D. La. 2004) (noting faxes sent directly to
email systems burden business’s computer networks); Covington & Burling v. Int’l
Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. 01-0004360, 2003 LEXIS 29, at *9-10 (D.C. Super. Apr. 17,
2003) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s incurred no costs because
plaintiff did not print out faxes) (“[T]he critical fact is that Covington’s fax server was
unavailable to receive or transmit other faxes. Covington’s memorandum and
affidavits in support of their summary judgment motion are persuasive that attorneys
and staff at Covington reported delays in sending or receiving faxes on the dates in
question.”). Sometimes more than the modem or sever is tied up. In one recent case, a
man’s whole computer became inoperable due to the deluge of unwanted faxed
advertisements sent to his computer modem. Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282
F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (D. Minn. 2002).
173
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 120.
174
Id.
175
Id. See Kaufman v. ACS Sys., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 317-18 (Ct. App. 2003)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that faxing technology outdates the TCPA cost-shifting
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Thus, the cost-shifting arguments for a broad ban
against unsolicited fax advertisements remain relevant and
persuasive, even in light of modern fax technological
developments and trends.
C.

Having Weak Federal Interstate Protection Will Undo
Any Strong Intrastate Protection Of Faxes

A main motivation behind the TCPA was to close up the
jurisdictional gap state telemarketing laws could not reach. 176
The TCPA explicitly does not preempt any state law that is
more restrictive than the TCPA. 177 In essence, the TCPA
creates a minimum floor of protection for telemarketing
legislation. Some states did not create intrastate junk fax laws
after the TCPA was enacted. 178 At least one state even
repealed its junk fax law because it was unnecessary in light of
the TCPA’s initial strict prohibition against all faxes. 179 The
Junk Fax Prevention Act did not amend the TCPA’s minimum
floor preemption provision. 180 Thus, for states with strong antijunk fax laws, 181 the Junk Fax Act Prevention Act severely
undermines these efforts because marketers will simply move
their faxing across state borders to trigger the weaker
interstate protection.
D.

Congress Should Have Deferred or Given More Weight to
the FCC’s Determination to Get Rid of the Fax EBR

The junk fax debate is understandably framed in terms
of consumer needs versus business needs. It can also be easily

needs because defendant presented no evidence of how many people actually use the
fancy technology).
176
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1970 (1991).
177
47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2000). In contrast, the Can-Spam Act preempted all
state laws involving email spam. Can-Spam Act, supra note 3, § 8 (“This Act
supersedes any statute, regulation or rule of a State . . . that expressly regulates the
use of electronic mail to send commercial messages[.]”).
178
For example, Iowa currently does not have a law regulating junk fax
within the state of Iowa.
179
See infra discussion in Part VI.
180
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 21 (2005).
181
For instance, Florida’s statute prohibits all intrastate junk faxes regardless
of any EBR between sender and recipient. See FLA. STAT. § 365.1657(1) (1997) (“It is
unlawful for any person to use a machine that electronically transmits facsimiles of
documents through connection with a telephone network to transmit within this state
unsolicited advertising material for the sale of any real property, goods or services.”).
The broad ban is similar to the original text of the TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4).
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viewed as a separation of powers struggle. Congress created
the TCPA with strict prohibition against faxes, but granted the
FCC the authority to implement its necessary rules. 182 The
FCC erroneously created a Fax EBR, which it later sought to
overturn. 183 Congress, unhappy with this decision to eliminate
the Fax EBR, enacted the Junk Fax Prevention Act. 184 This
action serves as a reminder to the FCC that while the agency’s
rulings have the force of law, Congress gave them the power to
promulgate rules in the first place. 185 Despite Congress’s
position as authorizing law maker, Congress should have
deferred more to the FCC’s decision to eliminate the Fax EBR.
First, the FCC had more time to study and consider the
Fax EBR effect, both as part of the comment process 186 and in
its various TCPA fines and cases, 187 since the Fax EBR’s
establishment in 1992. In contrast, the Senate had two weeks
of hearings in April 2005; the House had none. 188 It is likely
that Congress moved the bill faster than it should have due to
the impending FCC deadline of July 1, 2005. 189
Second, it remains questionable whether codifying the
Fax EBR was necessary to meet Congress’s true motivation in
rushing the Junk Fax Prevention Act. The 2003 FCC memo
announced two separate rule changes: (1) the elimination of the
Fax EBR and (2) consent to fax would need to be written,
signed and collected prior to a faxing campaign. 190
Notwithstanding the codification of the Fax EBR, the
legislative history primarily posits the Junk Fax Prevention
Act as legislation to prohibit the costs of obtaining prior written
consent for businesses. 191 So it seems very possible that
182

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).
See supra discussion in Part III.
184
See supra discussion in Part IV.
185
Congress created the FCC as part of the 1934 Communications Act. See
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html.
186
FCC, FCC 02-250, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE
TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991: NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING
3 (2002) (seeking comment on upcoming TCPA review).
187
See http://www.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/ufax.html for listing of recent TCPA
forfeitures and notices of apparent liability for unsolicited faxes.
188
See http://thomas.loc.gov (enter S. 714.ENR for bill number, and then click
on Congressional Record References for a history of the bill as passed).
189
See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
190
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 112-13.
191
See S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 6 (1991) (“This legislation is designed to permit
legitimate businesses to do business . . . without the burden of collecting prior written
permission to send these recipients commercial faxes.”); id. (noting that that trade
associations “would be saddled with a huge burden to collect signatures from each
183
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Congress could have respected the FCC’s Fax EBR elimination
but overturned the written consent requirement. Arguably,
Congress could have limited its TCPA amendment to its
adjustment of what consent meant in the definition of
“unsolicited advertisement,” which after the Junk Fax
Prevention Act reads “prior express invitation or permission, in
writing or otherwise” instead of the previous “prior express
invitation or permission.” 192 In regards to the specific “writing
or otherwise” change, the Senate Report states: “[t]he effect of
this amendment would be to statutorily prohibit the FCC from
promulgating a rule that would require prior express
permission to be secured only in writing.” 193 If Congress had
deferred to the FCC by allowing the Fax EBR to expire but had
changed consent to mean written or verbal, it would have
created a better balance between consumer and business needs.
VI.

FATE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION AND JUNK FAXES

With the passing of the Junk Fax Prevention Act,
businesses have a clear authorization to send junk faxes based
on an established business relationship. 194 In response to the
cost and privacy concerns of this new law, consumer advocates
are likely to focus on other avenues of change, including
mandated annual Congressional reports on junk faxes, the
possibility of a national do-not-fax registry, and state
legislatures reacting with stronger telemarketing statutes.
However, this Note argues these options are ineffective
solutions for prohibiting unfair cost-shifting from advertiser to
consumer, which is arguably the most important policy reason
for the ban against junk faxing.
Junk faxes essentially act as a “postage-due” tax on
consumers. This is true whether a person receives 500 junk
faxes or if a person receives one. Thus, merely reducing the
number of junk faxes to a more manageable level by allowing
only unsolicited fax advertisements sent based on an
member just to send an unsolicited fax advertisement.”); id. at 8 (“If this bill were
enacted, it would eliminate the requirement to obtain written permission from
customers[.]”); 151 CONG. REC. H5265 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Green) (“This new law will prevent businesses and realtors from having to fill out
paperwork to communicate with each other about an existing business relationship.”).
192
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(g). (emphasis added). Compare
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (2000), with Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(g).
193
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 11-12.
194
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(a).
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established business relationship is not a victory for
consumers. To truly protect consumers from unwarranted
costs, a ban on faxed advertisements sent without permission
must be a complete ban, as it was when Congress passed the
TCPA in 1991. Thus, Congress should eliminate the Junk Fax
Prevention Act’s statutory Fax EBR exemption.
A.

Future Congressional Review Under the Junk Fax
Prevention Act

Perhaps as a silent nod to the Junk Fax Prevention
Act’s inherent imbalance between business and consumer
needs, Congress included an order in the legislation that there
be future studies on the enforcement of junk faxing. This order
required an annual FCC report 195 and a study by the
Comptroller General of the United States to be completed nine
months after enactment. 196 In the original TCPA, Congress did
not include any annual review of faxing. 197
The Junk Fax Prevention Act’s future studies require
several things. First, the annual FCC report requires the
agency to report the number of complaints, citations and
notices of apparent liability regarding the junk fax provision.
Specifically, Congress is interested in considering how much
time passes between a consumer’s complaint and notice of
liability, 198 as well as how effectively the FCC recovers
monetary penalties. 199 The Junk Fax Prevention Act also
requires the General Comptroller of the United States to
complete a study on how the FCC handles its junk fax
enforcement. 200 Specifically, the law requires the Comptroller
to examine the impact and adequacy of existing statutory
remedies on both senders and recipients of junk faxes. 201 By
195

Id. § 3(g).
Id. § 4(a), (c).
197
See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
198
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 3(g)(4)(c). This “time between”
issue is very relevant to consumer protection because the longer the FCC waits to
address the complaint, the greater number unsolicited faxes the complaining consumer
is likely to receive, and thus, the higher the costs consumer is likely to incur.
199
Id. § 3(g)(5)-(8).
200
Id. § 4(a). The GAO will study how the FCC receives and investigates
complaints, the level of enforcement success the FCC achieves, and whether the FCC is
adequately enforcing complaints, among other things. Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3).
201
Id. § 4(b). In April 2006, the General Comptroller’s office released its first
report to Congress.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: WEAKNESS IN PROCEDURES AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
HINDER JUNK FAX ENFORCEMENT, GAO-06-425 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/
196
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adding this additional level of supervision—the Comptroller
will essentially be checking the FCC’s checking—Congress
indicates an unease that the bill it passed might not be the
most effective solution. While it is established jurisprudential
rhetoric that Congress does not have to hit the bulls-eye
perfectly when enacting legislation, 202 it seems Congress is
passing off the tough work—finding a true balance between
consumer and business needs in regards to junk fax
regulation—to some future Congressional session down the
line, all in exchange for helping lobbying businesses beat an
FCC deadline. 203
These Congressional studies on junk faxes are an
ineffective solution to prohibit cost to consumers for two
reasons. First, in order to see a trend in cost to consumers,
Congress will likely need at least two annual reports to
compare, which means any legislative adjustment based on
these annual reports will probably not be a possibility in the
near future. In the meantime, businesses will continue to
expose consumers to unwarranted costs by faxing unsolicited
advertisements pursuant to an established business
relationship. Second, by ordering an annual report, there is
simply no guarantee that the results of these reports will lead
to legislative adjustment. Thus, consumer advocates cannot
effectively rely on future Congressional studies to prevent costshifting.
B.

A National Do-Not-Fax Registry

For years, when challenging the constitutionality of
TCPA’s strict prohibition on unsolicited faxed advertisements,
defendants often pointed to creating a do-not-fax registry as a
They argued that such a list would allow
solution. 204
new.items/d06425.pdf. The report reveals that the immense increase in junk fax
complaints—from 2,200 in 2001 to 46,000 in 2005—is outpacing the FCC’s ability to
manage and address these complaints. Id. at 2.
202
See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co. 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993) (“Nor
do we require that the Government make progress on every front before it can make
progress on any front.”); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Congress may
reduce the volume of intrusive telemarketing calls without completely eliminating the
calls.”).
203
See supra discussion in Part IV.A. See also 151 CONG REC. H5264 (daily
ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Upton) (thanking the House for “expedite
consideration” because June 30 is “when the sands of the hourglass were about to run
out”).
204
See, e.g., Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers.
Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 816-17 (M.D. La. 2004); Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns &
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consumers to control the messages sent via fax and would give
legitimate marketers the ability to send some unsolicited
messages via fax to consumers who have not signed their fax
numbers to the registry. 205 As stated above, the Junk Fax
Prevention Act’s company-specific do-not-fax list, which
requires consumers to contact each company individually to opt
out of future unsolicited messages, does not prohibit costs to
the consumers and unfairly shifts the burden to consumers. 206
In response, consumers are likely to push for a national do-notfax registry. 207
When shaping any future rules for a national do-not-fax
registry, Congress and the FCC would likely consider the
recent rules authorizing the enactment of a do-not-call
registry. 208 The National Do-Not-Call Registry is a joint effort
between the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 209
The registry allows consumers to register their residential

Mktg., 282 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984 (D. Minn. 2002); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
205
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
206
See supra discussion in Part IV.
207
The strong, positive political response to the do-not-call registry led
Congress to include a provision in the Can-Spam Act that would allow for the
establishment of a national do-not-email registry. Adam Zitter, Note, Good Laws for
Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
2767, 2770 (2004). But the FTC later ruled that it would not establish a federal do-notemail opt-out system due to problems with effectiveness and enforcement. FTC Places
“Do Not Email” Registry Plan on Hold, ELEC. COMMERCE NEWS, Vol. 9, No. 13, June
21, 2004. Some commercial speech commentators note that this national registry trend
continues to inhibit a marketer’s ability to reach consumers in a cost-effective way.
Kavita Amar and Bruce E.H. Johnson, The Rights of Telemarketers, Faxers and
Spammers are Subordinated to the Rights of Consumers, 811 PLI/Pat 85 (November
2004).
208
For a comprehensive examination of the issue, see 2003 FCC Memo, supra
note 2, at 14-51. The TCPA as originally enacted authorized the FCC to consider a
nationwide do-not-call registry. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (2000). As part of its initial rulemaking, the FCC declined to adopt a nationwide list. 1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20,
at 7-10.
209
In 2003, the FTC amended its 1995 Telemarketing Sales Rule such that it
was an abusive telemarketing practice for a commercial telemarketer to call an
individual on a national do-not-call registry. Jack Gravelle, Note, Hold the Phone:
Making the Call For “Personal Exceptions” to the Do-Not-Call Registry, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
991, 1002 (2004). Many questioned the FTC’s authorization to create such a registry.
Id. at 1003. To quell this objection, Congress passed the National Do-Not-Call
Implementation Act, which authorized the FTC to collect fees to implement and enforce
a national do-not-call registry. Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 1006 (2003) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. III 2003)). The bill also required the FCC to issue final rules
regarding its Telephone Consumer Protection Act and to harmonize its do-not-call rules
with the FTC. Id. President Bush signed the bill into law on March 11, 2003.
National Briefing Washington: Bush Signs Do-Not-Call Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2003, at A20.
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telephone number, including wireless numbers. 210 Once on the
list, businesses may not make any interstate or intrastate
telemarketing calls to that number for the next five years.
There are some exceptions to the ban on calls, including an
established business relationship exception. 211 Once the five
years have passed, a consumer may re-enter the number on the
list. 212 A consumer can remove his or her number from the donot-call registry at any time. 213
One year after enacting the registry, the FTC reported
that the registry had been effective in greatly reducing the
number of telemarketing calls. For instance, one survey
conducted by a market research firm found that ninety-two
percent of adults who had signed up had fewer phone calls and
that twenty-five percent of adults who had signed up received
absolutely no phone calls. 214 Further, only less than one
210
2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 24 (“We conclude that the national
database should allow for the registration of wireless telephone numbers . . . .”).
211
Id. at 29-32. Other exemptions include commercial calls from charities and
political support groups. Id. at 53. This distinction between commercial calls based on
the subject matter of the call led to a Colorado district court ruling that the Do-NotCall registry violated the First Amendment. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC,
283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168 (D. Colo. 2003) (holding the Do-Not-Call registry is a
content-based regulation and violates the First Amendment), stay denied by 284 F.
Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 358
F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). A few months later, the Tenth Circuit held the registry
constitutional. See 358 F.3d 1228, 1242 (holding the registry to be narrowly tailored
without over-regulating protected speech).
212
See “Q&A: The National Do-Not-Call Registry,” http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
conline/pubs/alerts/dncalrt.htm.
213
See id. By creating an opt-out system, the government avoids First
Amendment problems because the consumer becomes the censor, while the government
is merely facilitating consumer choice. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d 1228 at 1233
(“The national do-not-call registry offers consumers a tool with which they can protect
their homes against intrusions that Congress has determined to be particularly
invasive.”). See also Rodney A. Smolla, The “Do-Not-Call List” Controversy: A Parable
of Privacy and Speech, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 743, 756 (2005). Many view the do-notcall registry as a triumph of consumer choice. See, e.g., id. at 757 (“Do-Not-Call is not a
paternalistic usurping of consumer choice; it is an empowerment of consumer choice, in
aid of the tranquility of the home.”). One commentator, however, argues that the
facilitation of consumer choice theory is only relevant when the government “present[s]
the public with a vast array of options,” something the commenter feels ‘opt-out’
systems that discriminate based on subject matter, such as the registry, do not provide
because the registry does not allow consumers to opt-out of political and charity
telemarketers. See Zitter, Note, supra note 207, at 2814-16 (2004).
214
FTC, Annual Report to Congress for FY 2003 and 2004 Pursuant to the Do
Not Call Implementation Act on Implementation of the National Do Not Call Registry
4 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/donotcall/051004dncfy0304.pdf.
Another survey, conducted by Customer Care Alliance between February and April
2004, showed that sixty percent of respondents who had registered their primary home
telephone number reported that they had experienced an eighty percent reduction in
the number of telemarketing calls. Id.
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percent of the numbers registered filed complaints about the
registry’s effectiveness. 215 By the end of the 2004 fiscal year,
consumers registered sixty-four million numbers. 216 While
consumers celebrated, telemarketing associations decried the
national registry for its negative financial impact on the
industry and the potential for abuse and misuse of the registry
contents. 217
Despite the positive consumer feedback for a federal donot-call list, a similar national do-not-fax list is an
inappropriate solution for faxed advertisements. 218 First, the
do-not-call registry exempts calls based on established business
Faxing technology’s unique cost-shifting
relationships. 219
features make established business relationship exemptions
unfairly burdensome and costly on fax machine owners. 220
Second, the do-not-call registry allows only residential phone
numbers to be listed. 221 This would not address the problems of
junk faxes interfering with business owners’ fax machines,
which become unavailable for receiving and sending legitimate
business faxes due to invading junk faxes. Finally, by creating
a list of do-not-fax numbers, Congress would be sending the
message that non-registered fax numbers are free targets for
fax solicitations. Such a message would be contrary to the cost
and privacy policies of the TCPA’s original blanket ban on
unsolicited faxed advertisements. 222 Thus, a national do-notfax registry similar to the national do-not-call registry would
not prevent cost-shifting.
C.

State Response to the Junk Fax Prevention Act

The junk fax fight started in the states, 223 so it is not
surprising that is where the junk fax fight will continue. There
215

Id.
Id.
217
Gravelle, Note, supra note 209, at 1007-09. For example, the telephone
numbers of several executives of the Direct Marketing Association were fraudulently
added to the list without the executives’ knowledge. Id. at 1008.
218
Courts have rejected defendants’ arguments that a federal do-not-fax list is
a better legislative solution than the TCPA junk fax ban. Accounting Outsourcing,
L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 816-17 (M.D. La.
2004); Destination Ventures Ltd. v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632, 639 (D. Or. 1994).
219
See FTC, OFFICE OF CONSUMER & BUS. EDUC., supra note 212, at 5-6.
220
See supra discussion in Part V.B.
221
See FTC, OFFICE OF CONSUMER & BUS. EDUC., supra note 212, at 3.
222
See supra discussion in Part II.B.
223
See supra notes 33-35 about pre-TCPA state laws.
216
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is concern that the federal Junk Fax Prevention Act weakens
state protection. California, for instance, recently enacted new
legislation in response to the Junk Fax Prevention Act that
would affect faxes coming into and out of the state. 224 State
legislation, such as this, likely violates the Supremacy
Clause, 225 and thus, is an ineffective solution for the junk fax
problem.
In 1991, while the TCPA was being formed, the
California legislature enacted a bill against intrastate junk
faxes as a stop gap measure until a federal law emerged. 226
When the TCPA became law, it was more restrictive than the
California bill, 227 so, per the TCPA, the federal law preempted
the California law. 228 In 2002, realizing it had what was
essentially a useless law on the books, the California
legislature repealed its state junk fax law. 229 Thus, the state
saw the TCPA’s broad prohibition against faxing as sufficient
protection. 230
That protection significantly changed after the passing
of the Junk Fax Prevention Act. California responded by
introducing new legislation in 2005 that would reinstate the
original level of protection found in the TCPA’s strict ban on
On October 7, 2005,
unsolicited faxed advertisements. 231
224

2005-667 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
226
1992-564 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering).
227
The 1992 California statute allowed junk faxing “as long as the sender
provided a toll-free number on the fax and honored any request by a recipient to be
removed from the fax advertising list.” Unsolicited Fax Advertising: Hearing on SB
833 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 2 (Cal. 2005), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_833_cfa_20050408_165850_sen
_comm.html [hereinafter Senate Bill Analysis]. By contrast, the TCPA as enacted
strictly prohibited the sending of unsolicited advertisements via fax, whether or not a
toll-free opt-out number was included on the fax. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000).
228
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
229
2002-700 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering); Senate Bill Analysis, supra
note 227, at 2 (“Although it took the Legislature almost 10 years to repeal California’s
weaker opt-out junk fax advertising law, the opt-in TCPA has been the law in the state
since 2002.”).
230
2002-700 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 1.
231
Senate Bill Analysis, supra note 227, at 2 (noting that Congress was
considering “a loophole in the TCPA [that] . . . [t]he author believes . . . if enacted
would reinstate the opt-out approach to junk faxing [in the 1991 California fax law]
and make the federal law nearly impossible to enforce. . . . In this way no matter what
Congress does to [the] TCPA, California citizens will be protected”).
225
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Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law SB 833,
which prohibited all unsolicited faxed advertisements—with or
The bill
without an established business relationship. 232
defined an unsolicited advertisement as an ad sent without a
recipient’s “prior express invitation or permission.” 233 What
made this bill remarkable, though, is the fact that the strict
prohibition applied if either the recipient or the sender is
located in California. 234 Thus, California essentially enacted a
bill affecting both intrastate and interstate communication of
faxes entering or leaving the state. The legislature sent a clear
message to Congress that interstate protection under the Junk
Fax Prevention Act is too weak to protect the state’s
consumers. 235 Ironically, the federal government’s key reason
for establishing a federal telemarketing law in 1991 was to
protect states. 236
Critics of the California law soon questioned whether
the Junk Fax Prevention Act would preempt the law’s
restrictions on interstate faxes. 237 A week before the California
law’s enactment date of January 1, 2006, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, in conjunction with a blast-fax service company,
filed a federal lawsuit to oppose the law. 238 The U.S. Chamber
of Commerce sought a declaratory judgment that the federal
junk fax law preempted the unconstitutional California junk

232

Governor Puts a Wrap on Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at B4.
2005-667 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering).
234
Id. (“It is unlawful for a person or entity, if either the person or entity or the
recipient is located within California, to use any telephone facsimile machine,
computer, or other device to send . . . an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone
facsimile machine.”) (emphasis added).
235
For California Senator Debra Bowen’s remarks to the American Chronicle,
see President Bush to Junk Faxers: Start Your Engines, AM. CHRON., July 11, 2005,
available at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=1093
(“Thanks to Congress and the President, marketers can now legally hijack people’s fax
machines and turn them into their own personal printing presses. . . . The silver lining
of the new law is it doesn’t prevent states from passing stronger laws and we need to
take advantage of that opening. We need a strong state junk fax ban to prevent
Californians from getting stuck paying for sales pitches they didn’t ask for and don’t
want.”).
236
See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
237
The Junk Fax Prevention Act did not affect the TCPA provision that stated
the federal law had no preemptive effect on more restrictive state laws. See generally
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5.
238
Lynda Gledhill, ‘Wasted Year’ Laws Take Effect; Measures on Faxes, Video
Games Held Up by Court Decisions, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 2006, at B1. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce won an injunction that stayed the state law until a judge could
consider the Chamber of Commerce’s case. Id.
233
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fax law. 239 In February 2006, an Eastern District of California
judge ruled that the California law’s interstate junk fax
restriction violated the Supremacy Clause and was preempted
by federal law. The law died before ever taking effect. Thus,
protecting consumers through stronger state junk fax laws
affecting interstate faxes is an ineffective solution due to their
questionable constitutionality.
Therefore, future Congressional studies, a national-donot-fax registry and stronger state laws affecting interstate
faxes offer inadequate protection for consumers against costshifting. If Congress truly wants to prevent economic injury,
then it should eliminate the Fax EBR and reinstate its
complete ban on unsolicited fax advertisements sent without
express permission, as set out in the TCPA as enacted.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Junk Fax Prevention Act undermines
the strict prohibition against junk faxing set out in the TCPA.
In rushing to meet the FCC’s expiration of the Fax EBR,
Congress overlooked well-established consumer protection
policies of privacy and cost-shifting. Additionally, Congress
disregarded the FCC’s experience with studying TCPA fax
issues and effectively weakened strong state protection against
junk faxing already in place. In order to sufficiently protect
consumers from unwarranted costs, Congress should reinstate
a complete ban on unsolicited faxed advertisements sent
without permission or consent.
It is an understatement to assert that there is a lot of
consumer dissatisfaction with telemarketing methods. In an
informative—but completely unscientific—online survey, Time
Magazine asked its website readers to nominate “The 100
Worst Ideas” of the twentieth century. 240 Telemarketing was
ranked fourth on the list, behind only prohibition, the computer
programming choice that led to the Y2K bug and Geraldo
Rivera’s decision to open the vault of Al Capone. 241 Despite
these strong feelings against telemarketing, it is extremely
239
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, No. 2:05-CV-2257-MCEKJM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8324, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006).
240
The 100 Worst Ideas of the Century, TIME, Jan. 19, 2000, http://www.time.
com/time/time100/worstideas.html.
241
Id. Telemarketing held a clear victory over other suggested worst ideas of
the century, including appetite-suppressant Fen-Phen, the crop chemical DDT, and
Ishtar, the much maligned Warren Beatty-Dustin Hoffman comedy. Id.
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important to remember that advertisers have First
Amendment protection, limited though it may be. This Note
does not challenge a legitimate marketer’s ability to share a
commercial message with consumers. It simply questions the
wisdom of doing so by a method that, due to its unique
technological architecture, shifts costs to consumers and
interrupts legitimate business with each unsolicited
commercial message sent. By passing the Junk Fax Prevention
Act and codifying the established business relationship for
faxes, Congress has authorized marketers to do just that.
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